Sanctions on Russia

Energy

  • 21st package of sanctions against Russia

    The package continues the EU’s focus on third-country entities facilitating sanctions circumvention, with particular attention to Kyrgyzstan and, this time, to financial channels. It includes the first transaction ban on a Kyrgyz bank, alongside measures against three other non-Russian banks and 14 crypto-asset service providers operating from third countries. The package also adds further shadow-fleet vessels and military-industrial entities, including companies based in China, including Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the UAE.

    It also expands measures against the oil sector, including Russian, Belarusian, and third-country refineries. Finally, the package introduces additional export restrictions on military-relevant goods and technologies, as well as new import restrictions on products generating revenue for Russia.

    Read more.

  • 20th package of sanctions against Russia

    The EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia primarily focuses on tightening enforcement rather than introducing entirely new sectoral bans. It deepens financial isolation by targeting additional banks and crypto channels, and places strong emphasis on closing circumvention routes by sanctioning third-country actors and restricting re-exports via countries like Kyrgyzstan. Trade measures expand controls on high-tech and dual-use goods critical to Russia’s military industry, while energy-related steps incrementally increase pressure on oil transport, including the shadow fleet. 

    Highlights:

    • Financial sector measures, including restrictions targeting additional Russian financial institutions and elements of the financial system (including crypto-related activities)
    • Measures targeting crypto-related channels, aimed at limiting Russia’s ability to use alternative financial infrastructure for sanctions circumvention
    • Sanctions on third-country actors (including entities in jurisdictions such as the UAE, China/Hong Kong, and Thailand) involved in facilitating sanctions evasion
    • First use of a country-level anti-circumvention instrument (Kyrgyzstan) to address systematic re-export of sensitive goods
    • Additional listings of entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex and supply chains
    • Expanded restrictions on trade in dual-use and advanced technology goods, particularly those relevant for military applications
    • Shadow fleet: designation of additional vessels and related entities, and ban on certain maritime-related services
    • Measures addressing disinformation and propaganda actors linked to the Russian state

    Read more here.

  • US Sanctions Waiver on Russian Oil

    The US introduced a temporary sanctions waiver on Russian oil, allowing shipments already at sea to be delivered under defined conditions. The measure was explicitly time-limited—lasting 30 days and expiring on 11 April—and was motivated by a need to stabilise global oil markets amid supply disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

    Early evidence suggests the waiver had a significant short-term impact. During its duration, Russian crude unloadings increased and storage levels fell sharply, contributing to a notable boost in Kremlin oil revenues.

    Since the waiver lapsed, the trend has begun to reverse. Daily average unloadings have dropped markedly, with key buyers such as India scaling back purchases, and Russian storage levels starting to rebuild.

    Read more.

  • Letter to the International Maritime Community

    The coastal states of the Baltic and North Seas jointly warn the international maritime community about increasing GNSS interference and AIS manipulation—primarily linked to Russia—as emerging threats to maritime safety. They call for improved preparedness, development of alternative navigation systems, and stricter compliance with international maritime regulations, while highlighting risks associated with shadow fleet operations.

    The announcement was followed in the subsequent week by several operations aimed at identifying and monitoring vessels exhibiting unsafe or non-compliant behavior in the region.

    Read more.

  • US Seizes Sanctioned Ships Marinera (ex-Bella 1) and Sophia

    On 7 January 2026, the United States executed coordinated interdiction operations at sea under its sanctions enforcement regime, seizing two oil tankers, the Marinera (formerly Bella 1) in the North Atlantic and the Sophia in the Caribbean Sea, for alleged violations of U.S. sanctions targeting the  “shadow fleet”. 

  • Fuel price support mechanism to remain in place

    A temporary moratorium has been introduced on canceling the fuel damper mechanism, meaning that the government will continue compensating refineries to stabilize domestic fuel prices.

  • Ban on the export of diesel, marine fuel and other gas oils

    Ban on the export of diesel, marine fuel and other gas oils.

  • Sanctions on Russia’s biggest oil companies: Rosneft and Lukoil

    The sanctions freeze the assets and financial interests of Rosneft, Lukoil, and their majority-owned subsidiaries. They are designed to cut off key revenue streams that finance Russia’s war effort.

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed these additional measures on Russia’s two largest oil companies — Rosneft Oil Company (Rosneft) and Lukoil OAO (Lukoil). Rosneft is a vertically integrated energy firm involved in the exploration, extraction, production, refining, transportation, and sale of petroleum, natural gas, and related products. Lukoil operates in the exploration, production, refining, marketing, and distribution of oil and gas both within Russia and internationally.

    By tightening restrictions on Russia’s energy sector, the sanctions seek to weaken the Kremlin’s ability to generate revenue for its military operations and to support its ailing economy.

  • 19th package of sanctions against Russia

    On 23 October 2025, the EU formally adopted the 19th package of sanctions against Russia. The package was already proposed on September 19th, but held back by opposition from Slovakia.

    The adopted package includes a ban on Russian LNG imports (phase-out in two stages: short-term contracts ended after 6 months, longer-term by 1 Jan 2027). Other measures strive to tighten control of circumvention, including new restrictions on energy exports and financial transactions, tighter controls on trade in dual-use goods, and expanded sanctions targeting cryptocurrency platforms and vessels involved in the so-called “shadow fleet.”

    A ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) has long been under discussion, facing opposition due to the long-term contracts that characterize this market. This package gives the measure concrete form and seeks to accelerate its implementation. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU imports of LNG have surged. While new suppliers have entered the picture, LNG volumes from Russia have not decreased. In some cases, they’ve even grown. Countries like Spain, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands remain significantly dependent on Russian LNG. Some of them have even increased imports compared to pre-war levels. Not all imported LNG is consumed within the EU; a substantial share was re-exported outside the EU gas system until March 2025, when the 14th sanctions package’s ban took full effect, indicating that these imports were driven more by commercial or strategic motives than by domestic demand.

    Russia is more dependent on the West for LNG than the West is on Russia. An estimated 93% of Russian LNG exports rely on G7+ maritime services for transport. Exporting LNG to China is theoretically an option, but logistically difficult and costly as Russia still lacks the shipping capacity. The preferred Arctic route via the Baltic Sea is only usable with ice-class vessels, of which Russia owns just 15. Compared to what happened with the oil embargo, LNG is harder to reroute, and there’s no “shadow fleet” of old tankers available to bypass sanctions. LNG tankers are a newer, more specialized technology, in high global demand. Not many outdated vessels lying around to be coopted.

    However, since the embargo is announced far in advance, Russia may benefit from excess earnings before it takes effect. A price cap could serve as a transitional measure. It would limit revenues during the adjustment period and prevent frontloading of Russian profits. Unlike oil, Russia would struggle to circumvent such a cap, due to lack of shipping capacity and technological constraints. But the secondary market for LNG vessels should be closely monitored. Transshipments should also be explicitly banned.

    Finally, the sanctions are not a call to replace russian LNG with other fossil fuels. Faster progress on energy efficiency and green transition would be an excellent complement.

  • Gas payments allowed via multiple banks

    Presidential decree extends until October 1, 2025, permission for foreign buyers to pay for Russian gas through banks other than Gazprombank.