In this report, the authors analyze Russia’s capacity to preserve and improve its strategic deterrent systems under conditions of heightened isolation. They begin by stressing that Moscow, despite a contracting economy and diminished international standing, has placed strategic forces at the core of its defense priorities. They note that new restrictions on both financial flows and technology, particularly dual-use components, pose a challenge for producers of sophisticated weaponry. Nonetheless, Russia’s leadership has historically insulated major nuclear and missile projects from broader economic problems, a pattern likely to persist.
Throughout their article, the authors emphasize that recent events, such as the extensive sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, amplify Russia’s longstanding difficulties in acquiring high-end electronics. Yet they find that the Kremlin is expected to continue seeking alternative supply routes (whether via third parties or ”illicit trade networks that pass through friendly countries”) and ramping up domestic substitutes where possible. This adaptation, while imperfect, means that disruption to Russia’s defense industry may remain less severe than some foresee, especially for smaller-scale items essential to nuclear and missile programs.
Another central theme is that the Kremlin treats strategic weapons as a hedge against its weaker standing in conventional warfare. The authors highlight how Russia’s military difficulties in Ukraine and the depletion of advanced conventional stocks could prompt even heavier investment in sub-strategic or “theater” nuclear arms. Such systems, from shorter-range warheads to dual-capable launchers, offer a cost-effective offset in a scenario where Western technology is harder to source and conventional rearmament lags. In addition, they discuss multiple “novel” Russian weapons projects—like new intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles—that appear primed to continue, given past successes in shielding them from economic downturns.
Ultimately, the authors present two contrasting trajectories for 2030: one in which Russia effectively circumvents export barriers, secures energy export revenues, and maintains a wide range of modernization programs, and another where deeper sanctions and heavier conventional losses compel it to focus more narrowly on nuclear options. In either path, the authors caution that nuclear forces remain a core strategic pillar for Moscow, underscoring that sanctions alone may not fully prevent Russia’s push to sustain or even expand key elements of its deterrent. One of the core messages is that consistent monitoring and strategic planning around Russia’s ongoing technical pursuits, particularly in nuclear fields, will remain essential, given the Kremlin’s resilience and willingness to prioritize its deterrent above nearly all other spending needs.
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