The author observes that sanctions on Russia have multiple aims: to deter aggression, punish military offenses, and impede Russia’s economic ability to wage war. While they did not stop the invasion outright, they have sharply constrained Russia’s finances, trade links, and military-industrial capacity. Russian import volumes dropped significantly in 2022, reflecting both self-imposed export reductions and Western restrictions. Though Russia continues to earn revenue from oil and gas, European embargoes and the G7 price cap are beginning to reduce these earnings. Formerly the EU was Russia’s main energy buyer, but sales have shifted to China and India, often at a discount and with elevated transport costs. In January 2023, tax receipts from oil exports declined noticeably, indicating growing fiscal strain.
According to Schott, these pressures have significantly restricted Russia’s access to key military components and advanced technologies. Russian manufacturers, including defense suppliers, have been forced to seek alternatives beyond traditional Western sources, turning to China and other non-Western markets. However, substitute goods are often costlier and of lower quality, complicating arms production, maintenance, and modernization. Replacing lost or worn-out military systems requires a steady flow of both standardized parts and high-grade technology, the flows that are now impaired. As a result, Russia’s ability to sustain large-scale conventional warfare will erode over time.
The paper highlights that Russia’s trade has pivoted rapidly toward Asia, especially China, but with important constraints. Beijing has increased trade but has not fully replaced Western ties and remains cautious about triggering secondary sanctions. Some re-exports through Turkey and Central Asian states have grown, and Russia attempts to reroute military-linked imports through smaller regional hubs. Yet these channels offset only a fraction of the lost flows. Smuggling and indirect sourcing are limited, and Russian firms now face higher costs and complexity when rerouting or obscuring transactions. The defense sector remains vulnerable to persistent supply bottlenecks, particularly for sophisticated components.
Western countries, especially in Europe, absorbed substantial economic costs in 2022, including spikes in energy prices. Yet Schott argues that political resolve has largely endured, supported by widespread outrage over Russian atrocities. Still, he warns that weakening coalition unity would undercut the sanctions’ long-term impact. He also notes that confiscating frozen Russian central bank assets could yield significant funding for Ukraine’s reconstruction, though legal debates continue.
In the broader picture, sanctions have accelerated Russia’s economic drift toward autarky, weakened investor confidence, and exposed China and India to the risks of over-reliance on Russian commodities. Over time, Russia is likely to become more isolated, with diminished access to foreign capital, constrained technological imports, and an industrial brain drain. Schott stresses that continuing Western resolve, including support for Ukraine’s defense, is essential to ensuring that sanctions remain a durable constraint on Russia’s military and economic capabilities.
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